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Summary findings
Survey  evidence  from  Mexico  reveals  large observed  environmental  policy  and  administration,  and  clean
differences  in pollution  from  factories  in the  same  technology  and  audits.
industry,  or the  same area,  or operating  under  the  same  Responses  about  obstacles  to better  environmental
regulatory  regime.  Many  factories  have adopted  performance  included  scarcity  of training  resources,
significant  measures  for pollution  control  and are in  government  bureaucracy,  high  interest  rates,  and
compliance  with environmental  regulations,  but  some  Mexico's  lack  of an  environmental  protection  culture.
have made  little  or  no such  effort.  Respondents  said that  senior  managers  did not
For  lack of data,  systematic  research  on the  reasons  emphasize  the  environment,  assigned  more  priority  to
behind  such  variations  in plant-level  environmental  economic  considerations,  and were  not  trained  in the
performance  (especially  on  how  impediments  to  subject.  There  were  too  few suitable  programs,  training
pollution  control  affect  plant  behavior)  is rare,  even in  was not  recognized,  and workers  were  not  interested  in
industrial  societies.  the  subject.  Most  important,  however,  little  information
Drawing  on  a recent  plant-level  survey of Mexican  was available  about  Mexico's  environmental  policy.
factories,  Dasgupta  identifies  a number  of performance  These  findings  suggest  the importance  of technical
variables  characteristic  of compliant  and  noncompliant  assistance  - especially  training  and  information.
plants,  as well  as factors  that  noncompliant  plants  In Mexico,  the information  gap on policy  is a major
perceive  to be obstacles  to pollution  control.  problem.  Mexican  environtmental  agencies  should  invest
Noncompliant  firms made  less effort  than  compliant  more  in technical  assistance  and  environmerntal  training
firms to change  materials  used,  to  change  production  targeted  to noncompliant  enterprises.  Environmental
processes,  or  to install  end-of-pipe  treatment  equipment.  education,  especially  of senior  managers,  could
They  had  significantly  fewer  programs  to train  their  significantly  improve  pollution  control.
general  workers  in environmental  responsibilities.  They  Maintaining  close  contact  with  noncompliant  firms,
lagged behind  in environmental  training,  waste  designing  programs  targeted  to  them,  and pursuing  them
management,  and transportation  training.  They  received  systemically  should  increase  their  responsiveness  to
less technical  training,  especially  about  the  enviro:ament,  regulations.
This paper  - a product  of Infrastructure  and  Environment,  Development  Research  Group  - is part  of a larger  effort  in
the group  to understand  the  determinants  of environmental  performance  in developing  countries.  The study  was funded
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Securing compliance with pollution regulations is a difficult task. Industry compliance with pollution
regulations is far from universal, even in North America (Magat and Viscusi,  1990; Laplante and Rilstone,
1995; Dion, Lanoie and Laplante, 1996). In developing countries, where budgets for monitoring and
enforcement of regulations are limited, compliance rates are often quite low (Hettige, Huq, Pargal and Wheeler,
1996). However, even in weakly regulated developing countries, plant-level  environmental performance varies
widely. Some plants clearly have adopted significant pollution control measures, and have better environmental
performance than others. Reasons for these variations would provide policy makers in developing countries
with much better specified options for pollution control. But data limitations have prevented systematic research
on the variation in plant-level environmental perforrnance as this necessary information is seldom gathered by
regulatory agencies. This paper seeks to fill the gap drawing on a recent plant-level survey of Mexican factories,
Using recent plant-level survey evidence, this paper analyzes the process of environmental performance from
the viewpoint of Mexican factories: compliant and non-compliant with environmental regulations. This paper is
effectively a sequel to Dasgupta, Hettige and Wheeler (1998), and focuses on two critical questions: First, what
policy relevant factors might have contributed to the observed differences in pollution from factories operating
under the same regulatory regime? Second, why do some factories find it difficult and respond slowly to
pollution control, while others respond quickly and effectively? Cluster analysis is used to identify dominant
behavior variables by partitioning factories into compliant and non-compliant categories. The analysis has
identified a number of significant performance variables distinguishing compliant and non-compliant categories,
as well as obstacles perceived by non-compliant firms.
These findings have interesting implications for the regulatory agencies of Mexico, the World Bank and other
development assistance institutions. For Mexican regulatory agencies, the results highlight the potential of
programs that can increase the elasticity of non-compliant firms' response to regulations and thereby provide
maximum leverage in their pollution control systems. The findings will also be of importance for development
assistance institutions such as the World Bank, in identifying projects and policy reforms that offer the optimum
potential for reducing the plant-level gap in pollution control performance and improving environmental quality.
2The remainder  of this paper is organized  as follows. Section  2 describes  the survey that has been used for our
analysis,  and introduces  the data. The analytical  approach  and results are discussed  in section 3. Section  4
briefly concludes  the paper.
2. The Mexico Survey of Industrial Polluters
During the past forty years, Mexico has built one of the largest industrial economies  in the developing world.
Until recently, however, pollution control regulation has received little attention. At the national level, an
institutional response to the industrial pollution problem began in the late 1980's and has accelerated during the
past few years. In its first phase of development,  the national  regulatory system has had an emphasis  on
command-and-control regulation. The environmental performance of polluters is evaluated according to
compliance with numerous licenses and permits issued to each plant.
Environmental management in Mexico has been a multi-institutional  administration. Different aspects of
industrial pollution control have been the responsibility of different agencies within SEMARNAP: Of the
principal units, Procuraduria Federal de Proteccion al Ambiente (PROFEPA) is in charge of factory inspectioris
and enforcement of pollution regulations for toxic emissions. Although during the 1990's,  PROFEPA expanded
its activities from a few inspections per year to several thousand, as the Mexican pollution control system is still
relatively new, many Mexican factories have not yet been inspected. Of the other principal units, the instituto
Nacional de Ecologia (INE) is in charge of formulating national environmental regulation.
The data used for this paper were elicited from a large national survey of Mexican manufacturers  carried out in
the fall of 1995. The survey was designed by a World Bank team. The Monterrey Institute of Technology (MIT)
conducted the survey, with the explicit support of Mexico's  National Environment Ministry, Secretaria del
Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca (SEMARNAP) and the Mexican National Association  of
Industries. The survey focused on four sectors which were estimated to generate between 75% and 95% of
Mexico's  total industrial pollution:  Food, chemicals, non-metallic minerals, and metals. In-depth interviews
were conducted at 236 facilities in medium, large-sized cities, and industrial corridors of Mexico. The sample
was carefully selected to represent Mexican factories in a set of categories defined by sector, size class, and
ownership. Information on distribution of survey respondents can be found in Table 1.To minimize  reporting  bias, the survey  was conducted  only after agreement  by all sponsors  (the Government,
the Bank and the Industries  Association)  that the MIT team would not reveal the identity of the plants surveyed
or the respondents  within  the plants. Given this level of confidentiality,  the survey  provides very detailed
information  about  environmental  performance  and its determinants  including:  plant, firn characteristics;
sources  of environmental  information;  the quality and cost of the relationship  with regulators; obstacles  faced
and the measures  taken by plant management  to improve  performance.  '
As we had no access  to independently  audited data on pollution and regulatory compliance,  this analysis  of
Mexican  factories relies solely on self-reported  survey  information  on environmental  performance. Table 2
summarizes  the survey  respondents' assessment  of their facilities' compliance  with conventional  regulatory
standards  as applied by Mexican  environmental  inspectors.  With confidentiality  reasonably  well assured, 50%
of survey respondents  overall reported that their factories  were not in compliance  with environmental
regulations.  Only 10%  rated their facilities as excellent  (performance  far more than necessary  for compliance),
and approximately  the same proportion  that rated their facilities as poor (never in compliance)  and very poor
(far below compliance;  very damaging).
Recent work on industrial  pollution in Asia and Latin America  has suggested  that the characteristics  which best:
explain variations  in plant-level  environmental  performance  are: plant size, ownership,  and sector  of productioni;
as plants and firms of different  sector, size, and ownership  generally  assess enforcement  probabilities  and
expected  costs in different  ways.
*  Plant size: Generally  the pollution load of a firm is closely  related to, and grows with scale of
operation,  ceterisparibus. Studies of the relationship  between  plant size and pollution  abatement
For the survey  questionnaire  with complete  set of responses,  see
http://www.worldbank.org/nipr/work_paper/  ]877/survey/index.htm
4have suggested scale economies in abatement. Scale also works through a 'visibility effect'  (Pargal
and Wheeler, 1996): larger polluters are generally more detectable by surrounding communities, and
may well be under stronger pressure to abate.
*  Ownership: Recent research in North America, Latin America and Asia (Laplante and Lanoie, 1994;
Laplante, Lanoie and Roy, 1997; Dasgupta, Laplante and Mamingi, 1997) has shown that the
environmental performance of a firm affects its stock price in both developed and developing
countries. Publicly traded firns  whose good performance is publicized receive premia in the market
and bad performers are discounted. Since this provides an additional incentive to control pollution,
one would expect publicly traded firms to have stronger environmental management than their
privately held counterparts.
e  Sector: Industry sectors vary significantly in their average pollution intensity of production
(pollution per unit of output). Sectors such as metals and chemicals have the potential to generate
much higher pollution per unit of output than industries that assemble electronics. Pollution
abatement costs also differs widely across sectors of production (Dasgupta, Huq, Wheeler and
Zhang, 1996; Hartman, Singh and Wheeler, 1997).
The self-assessment of Mexican firms in our survey confirmed the expected variation in compliance pattern
according to plant size, ownership, and sector of production. The proportion  of non-compliant firms
(documented in table 3) shows a variation in the 40-60% range in various sub samples. When classified by size,
54% of the respondents in small enterprises (with 16-100 employees) were not in compliance with
environmental regulations, as opposed to 41% in large enterprises (with more than 250 employees).  When
classified by ownership, the proportion of non-compliant respondents was 60% in individually or family owned
enterprises, as opposed to 42% in the publicly traded category. Variation was also found across different sectors
of production. 52% of plants in food, 42% in chemicals, 45% in non-metallic minerals, and 59% in metal
industries were not in compliance with regulations.
53. Dominant Partitioning  Variables Based on Cluster Analysis
a) The Method.
After classifying the survey respondents into two groups: compliant and non-compliant,  an attempt was made to
identify the variables "dominant" in the formation of two groups. Variables were identified for which the
responses were relatively homogeneous for members within the group of non-compliant firms and relatively
heterogeneous between members of non-compliant and compliant groups. Using cluster analysis, the two
following tests were performed to identify the dominant partitioning variables.
First, the population of all factories were considered with the assumption that with respect to each variable i,
this population is normally distributed with mean p; and standard deviation oa. Further, it was  assumed that the
groups of compliant and non-compliant firms are samples taken from this normal population with group mean
xi  and group standard deviation si  Then,  the first test statistic  Zi = (xi  - t) / (a 1 /%i,), with n  =  the number of
factories in the previously defined cluster was computed. If for one particular variable, a group has a high z-
value, this distinguishes the variable from the population in general.
The second test was based on the modified chi-square statistic, defined as C72  = si 2 /aY 2. If the C 2 value for a
variable is low, this means that for this variable, the difference between the values within the group is small
relative to that in the population. Such a variable indicates a common characteristic between factories in a
group.
A variable is labeled  "dominant"  if  it satisfies both tests at the 99% confidence level.
b) Results:
Cluster analysis results for Mexican firms not in compliance with environmental regulations are documented in
Tables 4 and 5. These tables record the responses by which non-compliant firms are characterized ("dominant"
variables): variables whose values are similar for the non-compliant plants in the sample, but quite different
6from the average value of all plants. Table 4 documents the dominant environmental performance  variables, and
Table 5 records the dominant obstacles perceived by the non-compliant firms at the 99% confidence level.
In response to the question regarding specific plans or steps taken to improve environmental performance since
1990, the efforts of non-compliant small firms in changing material use, changing production process,
installation of end-of-pipe treatment equipment significantly fell short of the average responses of the firms
included in the survey. Non-compliant  individually/family  owned businesses and non-compliant firms in the
food industry also admitted their relatively low effort in changing material use in the past.
Regarding technical assistance on environmental aspects, responses revealed its uneven distribution across
Mexican firms over the past two years. Evidence clearly indicates that non-compliant firms in the 'small'  size,
individually/family  owned categories, and in chemical and metal industries received comparatively less
technical assistance over the past two years. Individual responses repeatedly highlighted environmental training,
policy, administration, clean technology and audits as specific areas where technical assistance was lacking. In
contrast, non-compliant firms in the publicly traded category and in the food industry, appearing as separate
clusters, received relatively higher amounts of technical assistance especially for environmental policy over the
past two years.
A similar remark can be made about the training programs in place to train general workers in environmental
responsibilities  in non-compliant enterprises.  At present, non-compliant firms of 'small'  size, in
individually/family owned categories, and in the chemical and non-metallic minerals industries reported
significantly fewer programs to train their general workers environmental responsibilities.  Especially in the
areas of general environmental training, waste management, and transportation their training efforts were
lagging far behind. Among the non-compliant firms, publicly traded firms were the only exceptions, reporting
significant number of general environmental training programs for their workers.
A number of questions were also included in the survey to elicit the firms'  perception of the obstacles for
improving environmental performance. Although all the responses were valuable sources of information,
obstacles perceived by non-compliant firms (if there is any) are particularly useful from the regulators'
7standpoint.  Table 3 records the dominant  obstacles  perceived  by the non-compliant  firns: external,  internal as
well as problems  faced in environmental  training  programs and in gathering information.
From the list of twelve 2 possible  external obstacles,  non-compliant  survey respondents  significantly  identified
the importance  of five. However,  the perceptions  of the respondents  in this regard  varied considerably.  "High
interest rates" were perceived  as a significant  obstacle  by only 'small' non-compliant  firms. On the other  hand
'large' non-compliant  firms pointed out "lack of environmnental  culture in Mexico" to be the most critical
obstacle.  "Government  bureaucracy"  was a significant  obstacle for individually/family  owned and publicly
traded  firms. "Scarcity of information  regarding policy  requirement"  and "scarcity of resources  for training"
were perceived  as obstacles  by small, individual/family  owned non-compliant  firms and non-compliant  firms in
chemical and metal sectors. It is interesting  to note that the surveyed  non-compliant  firms do not perceive
environmental  standards  to be inappropriate  for Mexico.
On the contrary,  respondents'  perceptions  of the critical  internal obstacles  display a noticeable uniformity.  The
non-compliant  respondents  of different  categories  labeled  four out of the eleven 3 listed internal  obstacles  as
being critical.  Out of the four obstacles,  three overwhelmingly  identified  and blame the attitude of senior level-
management:  "lack of emphasis  on environmental  aspects",  "higher  priorities given  to economic  aspects", and
"lack of training at management  level". In addition to the attitude of senior management,  only 'small' non-
compliant  firms identified  a "lack of access  to environmental  consultants  and counselors"  as being another
critical obstacle for improving  their performance.  Once again, it is interesting  to note that non-compliant
2 Including  high interest  rates, government  bureaucracy, scarcity  of information  regarding policy requirements,  scarcity of
information  regarding appropriate  technology,  scarcity of resources,  scarcity of resources  for training, ineffective  environmental
regulations  for training,  ineffective  environmental  regulations,  environmental  standards  inappropriate  for Mexico, environmental
standards  inappropriate  for local conditions,  inconsistency  among different governmental  agencies and bias in enforcement  of
environmental  regulations.
3Including  the importance  of economic  priorities,  lack of internal  knowledge  about appropriate  technology, lack of training at
management  level, lack  of emphasis  by senior management  on the environment,  lack  of emphasis  by medium-level  management
on the environment,  lack  of interest by workers in environmental  aspects, lack of training for workers, lack of access  to
environmental  consultants  and counselors,  shortage  of resources, unreasonable  internal  environmental  standards  and lack of
incentives  for environmental  improvement.
8respondents did not cite a "lack of interest by workers in the environment"  as being an important internal
obstacle.
In the context of environmental training, "dearth of suitable programs", "dearth of recognition of training", and
"dearth of interest of the workers" were repeatedly cited as the most serious problems. Again, of the non-
compliant firms surveyed, none of them considered the cost of training programs or shortage of instructors to be
serious problems.
Finally, all the surveyed non-compliant firms, irrespective of size, ownership, or sectors of production reported
facing significant difficulties in finding relevant information. Their responses indicate that although in the past
their search for a system of environmental administration  and technology for pollution control uniformly fell
short of average query, all of them actively looked for information regarding environmental policy. Although
follow-up questions were asked to identify specific problems faced in the information search, unfortunately no
clear pattern emerged from their responses.
4. Conclusion
Survey evidence from Mexico revealed large observed differences in pollution from factories in the same
industry, -the same area, and operating under the same regulatory regime. While many factories have already
adopted significant measures  for pollution control, and are in compliance with environmental regulations,  some
factories make very little or no pollution control effort.
For any regulatory mechanism to be effective, regulators must have a clear understanding of the reasons behind
variation in plant-level  environmental performance, and especially of potential impediments,  and their likely
effects on pollution control behavior of plants. But systematic research on these issues is rare, even in industrial
societies due to data limitations. Drawing on a recent plant-level survey of Mexican factories, this paper has
identified a number of significant performance variables distinguishing  compliant and non-compliant categories,
as well as obstacles perceived by non-compliant firms. 4
4  Anonymous  survey responses prevented  us from an in-depth analysis of specific cases of non-compliance.
9Regarding specific steps taken to improve environmental performance, responses revealed that the efforts of
non-compliant firms in changing material use, changing production process, and installation of end-of-pipe
treatment equipment significantly fell short of the average responses of all firms included in the survey. At
present, non-compliant firns  have significantly fewer programs to train their general workers environmental
responsibilities. In the areas of general environmental training, waste management, and transportation training
efforts are lagging far behind. Furthermore, there is evidence of an uneven distribution of technical assistance
across Mexican firms over the past two years, with non-compliant firms receiving comparatively less technical
assistance. Technical assistance was particularly lacking in the areas of environmental training, policy,
administration, clean technology and audits.
Responses regarding external obstacles for improving environmental performance are varied. Scarcity of
resources for training, government bureaucracy, high rates of interest, and a lack of environmental  culture in
Mexico have all been pointed out as existing external obstacles. In contrast, non-compliant respondents of
different categories have uniformly labeled attitude of senior level-management: "lack of emphasis on
environmental aspects", "higher priorities given to economic aspects", "lack of training at management level" to
be the most critical internal obstacles. "Dearth of suitable programs", "dearth  of recognition of training", and
"dearth of interest of the workers" were repeatedly cited as the most serious obstacles for environmental
training. Finally, all of the surveyed non-compliant firms reported facing significant difficulties in finding
relevant information, especially information on environmental policy in Mexico.
Finally, I conclude with implications of the findings. For the World Bank and other development assistance
institutions, these findings re-emphasize the importance of technical assistance projects, especially training and
information dissemination. For Mexican regulatory authorities, the results highlight the potential of programs,
which will provide maximum leverage in their pollution control systems. Clearly, the informational gap
regarding policy seems to be a major problem of the system. Mexican environmental agencies should consider
investing more in technical assistance, and environmental training programs targeted to non-compliant
enterprises. Environmental  education programs, with particular attention to senior managers have momentous
potential in their pollution control system. In conclusion, maintaining close contact with non-compliant firms,
designing targeted programs and pursuing them systematically should increase non-compliant firms'
responsiveness to regulations and promote a more effective environmental management in Mexico.
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11Appendix:
Table 1: Distribution of Survey Respondents
Food  Chemical  Non-Metallic  Metals
Minerals
Individually/  Public  Individuall  Public  Individuall  Public  Individual/  Public
family owned  y/family  y/family  family
owned  owned  owned
Small  13  4  14  5  20  6  18  5
Medium  9  10  11  7  8  4  12  3
Large  10  8  5  7  6  5  4  12
12Table 2: Self-Assessed Environmental  Performance
Environmental Performance  Number  of Plants  % of Total
Excellent: Far more than necessary for compliance  23  10
Good: Almost always in compliance  96  41
Fair: Occasionally compliant  99  42
Poor: Never in compliance  10  4
Very Poor: Far below compliance; very damaging  8  3
13Table  3: Environmental  Performance  by Size, Ownership,  and Sector  of Production
Total  Small  Large  Individually/  Public  Food  Chemical  Metals  Non-
family  Metallic
Owned  Minerals
Total number  of  236  92  71  121  74  62  62  61  51
survey  respondents
Number of  117  50  29  72  31  32  26  36  23




Proportion  of  0.50  0.54  0.41  0.60  0.42  0.52  0.42  0.59  0.45




14Table 4: The dominant variables for the clusters of firms not in compliance with environmental  standards
Variables  Mexican  industrial  enterprises  not in compliance  with environmental  standards
Total  Small  Large  Individually/  Public  Food  Chemical  Metals  Non-
family  Metallic
Owned  Minerals
Have plans/ have undertaken
projects  to improve environmental
performance  since 1990
1  . Have changed  (-)  (-)  (-)
(eliminated/  reduced)
material  use
2.  Have changed  (-)
process




Have received technical  assistance  (-)  (-)  (+)  (+)  (-)  (-)
in last two years  ___  _
I.  for environmental  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-) 
training  ______
2.  for environmental  (+)  (+)  (-)  (-)
policy  __  _  ______
3.  for clean technology  __  _-)  __  _  (-)
4.  for environmental  (-)  _  ()
administration
5.  for audits  _0__  _  (-)  _(-)
6.  for analysis of waste  (+)
Have training programs to train  |  (-)  |  (-)  (-)
general workers environmental
responsibility  _____  __  =__  _
1.  waste management  A  (-)  - (-)  (-)  ()
2. transportation  (-  (-  _____(-  ___
3. general environmental  (0)  (-)  |(-)  ()  (-)
training
4. health and industrial  (-)
safety  ____l
5. programs  of  (-)
environmental  awareness
The (+) and (-) refer to a positive  and negative  Z-value, respectively.  Note that C 2 is always  positive.
15Table 5: Critical  Obstacles  for Improving  Environmental  Performance
Variables  Mexican  industrial  enterprises  not in compliance  with environmental  standards




I. High  interest rate  (+)
2-Government  bureaucracy  (.)._____.().____(-)  (+)_(+)
3. Scarcity  of information  re: policy  (+)  (+)  (+)
requirements  _
4. Scarcity  of resources for training  (+)  (+)  _  (+)  (+)
5. Ineffective  environmental  (-)
regulations
6. Ineffective  environmental  (+)
regulations
7. Environmental  standards  (-)  (-)  (-)
inappropriate for Mexico  _____
Internal Obstacles:  _  _____
1.  Economic  priorities  are more  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)
important  _____
2. Lack of training at management  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)
level
3. Lack of emphasis on environment  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)
by senior management
4. Lack of interest  of workers in  (-)
environmental aspects  _
5. Lack of access to environmental  (+)
consultants  and counselors
Have experienced  difficulty  finding  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)
information  related to environment
Had looked for information regarding
1. Policy  (  (+)  (+)  (+)  (  +)  (  +)  (+)  _
2. System of environmental  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (.)  (-)  (-)
administration
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Problems  faced:
I. Availability  (-)
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2. Lack of programs  _  (+)  (-)  (+)  (-)
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4. Lack of recognition of training  (+)  (+)  (+)
5. Lack of interest of the workers  (  (4)  (-)  _
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